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TECHNIQUES FOR AVOIDING BIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION
OF THE OUTER PLANETS BY ATMOSPHERIC PROBES
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Summary
The likelihood of biologically contaminating a planet by an atmospheric
probe has a low probability of occurring if the probe is kept biologically
clean during terrestrial operations and if the structure remains in tact until
the planets life zone is completely penetrated. These appear to be reasonable
conclusions even though multiple probe and flyby missions are planned to
each planet during prescribed periods of biological interest, nominally
twenty years after first encounter. The situation differs significantly
between a flyby and an entry mission. In the former the vehicle is programmed
to miss the planet's capture area from initial insertion. It is progressively
controlled to assure a miss throughout the transit flight. The latter on the
other hand is targeted at an aim point well within a capture radius from its
first correction maneuver. Only after release of a probe is the carrier
redirected to miss the planet. Even so the probability of contamination,
using NASA specified growth probabilities and substantiated assumptions, is
of the order of 2.11 x 10-5 for Saturn and Uranus, which is somewhat lower
than the proposed NASA allocations for the two planets, 5.13 x 10-5 for an
unsterilized probe.
The margin between probability and allocation is small so high standards
of cleanliness, monitoring and estimating for remedial actions must be main-
tained in a probe program. It is not a foregone conclusion, however, that
heat sterilization as practiced on prior programs (Surveyor, Ranger and Viking)
needs to be employed. The use of several techniques having a good potential
for lower probe costs are available and appear adequate to render a probe
sterile within acceptable bounds. The techniques considered to be satisfactory
for minimizing microbial load include: (1) combined heat (at 95-105'C) and
gamma radiation, (2) short-term heating at 1050 + 50C to inactivate all
vegetative microbes, (3) irradiation routinely by ultraviolet (UV) light,
(4) wiping by a bactericidal agent with or without a penetrant, and (5)
cleanliness alone.
Cost savings up to two-thirds can accrue and a preclusion of deliberate
program stretchout are attainable if the cleanliness procedures studied are
instituted. Careful surveillance of all steps, in particular, during storage
and handling can inhibit growth or accumulation of spores. Remedial measures
may occasionally have to be conducted but costly use of high temperature parts,
testing to assure performance after repeated heat cycling, and reduced
complexity of monitoring and bookkeeping can be avoided.
Conclusions
1. Targeting the spacecraft and probe to miss the planet (probe deflection
procedure) yields a PC = 9.9 x 10-5 probability of contamination allocation
from the probe; targeting both at the planet (bus deflection procedure)
lowers the allocation to 5.13 x 10-5
2. Contamination of a planet by exterior surfaces is precluded by cleanliness
in fabrication, interplanetary exposure hazards (radiation primarily) and
high entry temperatures. Contamination by internally located spores is
precluded if the structure remains intact through the life zone. In pre-
scribed life zones a 5a structure provides this integrity.
3. Cleanliness accompanied by mild heating (90-1000C) with irradiation (y) can
keep microbial loads below 3 x 105 spores which is an objective cleanliness
requirement. A mild final heat cycle or irradiation by y-rays will inact-
ivate vegetative bacteria thereby simplifying monitoring requirements.
4. Additive costs due to fulfilling planetary quarantine requirements can be
held to twelve percent or less by use of cleanliness techniques itemized
herein with no program stretchouts required.
5. Jupiter is so inhospitable to terrestrial biology that heat sterilization
is unnecessary. Saturn is the most hospitable (considering current state
of our knowledge of its atmosphere) so a probe to that planet should
retain the highest P.Q. standards. Uranus which is least well understood
is assumed to be intermediate to the other two and may be the least
hospitable. Titan is not thoroughly analyzed but poses a contamination
potential not found in the three outer planets examined because it will
involve impact of a probe with the surface without having been subjected
to high levels of trapped radiation or high ambient (auto-sterilizing)
temperatures.
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INTRODUCTION TO BIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION
The study objective is to identify techniques needed to fulfill quarantine
requirements at costs reduced from those encountered in other planetary entry or
satellite lander programs. The study is restricted to contamination of the
atmospheres by the entry probe even though a distinct probability exists that
the spacecraft bearing the probe can contaminate the atmosphere, also. The
study is also limited to the atmosphere, roughly to the cloud layers, because
ambient temperatures ultimately exceed auto-sterilization levels until the
probe has descended to very low levels. Thus, an entry probe is expected to
be completely sterile prior to normal atmospheric breakup or surface encounter,
assuming that one exists. Titan and other satellites pose special problems
owing to the fact that they do have surfaces and ambient temperatures probably
do not assure full sterilization prior to touchdown.
This study is essentially a continuation of a contracted effort (NASA
Contract NAS 2-7328, Modification 4) which is reported in Reference 1. The
effects on design, weight and cost on a previously designed Saturn/Uranus
Atmospheric Entry Probe (SUAEP) were determined in that report using Viking
procedures as a base and cost estimating relationships from MDAC-E efforts on
Voyager Phase B and Viking preparatory studies.
This report covers a large segment of available literature and discussions
held with key personnel actively engaged in planetary quarantine implementation
methods. Assembly and cleanliness techniques are postulated which are believed
to-be compatible with the inherently low probability of contamination of the
outer planets. They are low-cost procedures which fulfill the goal of the two
contract modifications.
The requirements for maintaining the outer planets in a quarantined
condition insofar as terrestrial biology is concerned differ in character from
those of Mars because landings on a surface are not as yet contemplated. The
structures of the planets appear, at this time, to obviate penetration to a
liquid or solid surface. Descent in the atmospheres is through increasingly
dense gases which get hot enough eventually to destroy bacteria if structural
integrity of an entry vehicle is provided in the design and aiming accuracy is
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assured throughout interplanetary operation. This premise fulfills the agree-
ments made in COSPAR (Committee of Space Research) negotiations; however, it
does modify application of principles and design emphases in the analysis. Both
can result in changes in the ultimate magnitude of costs to the outer planet
programs.
The NASA established the planning philosophy and constraints for planetary
quarantine in Reference 2. This document lays the groundwork for preparation
of a Planetary Quarantine Plan for all unmanned planetary flight programs
that have space vehicles which are intended to encounter, orbit or flyby planets
of biological interest. Another NASA document (Reference 3) specifies the
planetary and mission probabilities of contamination Pc and growth PG for
the planets. In general, the planets for which approved flybys and entries
are in the development stages have specified contamination values in force.
Relative to outer planets this is currently limited to Jupiter. However, a
guideline specification sheet also exists for Saturn. In this study Saturn and
Uranus probabilities of contamination and growth have been assumed to be equal.
The probability of contaminating one of the outer planets or one of its
satellites by terrestrial microbiology is considered to be low if safeguards
are placed on the mission from an early stage of a probe's development. To
avoid biological contamination by an entry probe, safeguards such as controlling
mission entry within a defined corridor, minimizing the microbial load prior
to launch, and configuring the probe so that release is inhibited during high
altitude (low ambient temperature) regions of the planet. Entry into an outer
planet differ radically from terrestrial planets and all satellites in that
surface encounter and potential break-up is not a factor in release mechanisms.
The very massiveness of the planets tends to preclude contamination by two or
three hazards associated with them, viz., (1) high entry velocities generate
extremely high temperatures, (2) increasing density of the atmospheres and
internal exothermic processes cause autosterilization temperatures to be
attained eventually, and (3) trapped radiation surrounding Jupiter (and
perhaps Saturn and Uranus) effectively reduce bioburdens prior to atmospheric
entry.
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The probability of contamination is analytically determined without a heat
sterilization cycle in order to define the required number of decades of bio-
burden reduction to be imposed. The procedure is defined by NASA and overall
allocation for each planet set by the Planetary Quarantine Officer. For a
probability of contamination of 1 x 10-4 for each mission (the same value used
in the Pioneer 10 and 11 missions), the allocation for Saturn or Uranus for a
probe is 5.13 x 10-5. The allocation is based on the Saturn/Uranus Atmospheric
Entry Probe (SUAEP) study guideline of spacecraft targeted at the planet from
the first correction maneuver. A probability of contaminating Saturn or Uranus
with spores equal to 2.11 x 10-5 results in a marginal situation. Hence, a
reduction of bioburden by direct action may be required to provide a margin
of safety at launch.
The techniques for bioburden reduction available include dry heat sterili-
zation of components and the assembly (see Reference 1), combined heat and gamma
radiation cleanliness in fabrication combined with heat or irradiation, and
cleanliness alone. Several techniques are reviewed for relative effectiveness
and programmatic impact. Cleanliness combined with direct irradiation with
ultraviolet is concluded to fulfill the requirements of planetary quarantine
in the Jovian planet entries but not their satellites. The planets have a
limited life support zone that will be encountered at high planetary atmospheric
levels, whereas, the satellites possess an atmosphere too tenuous to preclude
impact, probable break up, and release of buried microbial load.
The keys to avoidance of contamination in the planetary atmospheres are
low initial spore levels, self sterilization in the currently defined
atmospheres owing to high heat transfers to external layers of a probe, and
assurance that buried or encapsulated microbes are contained until ambient
temperatures attain a time-temperature condition which reduces residual bio-
burdens to a nonreplicating condition. The structure must be designed to
withstand 5 standard deviations above defined loads to assure this. Ultimate
probe failure is postulated as melting of the internal aluminum structure
which is a condition that is well above life sustaining capability of any
terrestrial microbes.
Schedule and cost effects indicate that a probe that is designed to with-
stand repeated heat cycles to control initial load can add up to two months to the
probe development period and up to 21% additional costs. An alternative
fabrication and control concept based on the use of a Class 100 room with either
periodic ultraviolet radiation reductions of bioload or a single heat steril-
ization cycle at 113 0C can reduce the time element by one or two months and
added costs to 12%. Another alternative would employ standard spacecraft
assembly areas (Class 100,000) with biological monitoring and routine bioload
reductions by ultraviolet irradiation and/or biocidal agents coupled with
protective devices to prevent contamination. This technique ie estimated to
cost 7% more than a probe built without regard to planetary quarantine
requirements. In all cases these estimates represent a total cost to the
program of 6% or less.
This report examines the probabilities of contamination which sets the
requirements for maximum bioload that is acceptable, minimization techniques,
entry contamination by various release mechanisms, and schedule and cost impacts.
Some procedures are appended and the Jovian radiation kill capability is included
for reference. Conclusions are stated to assist in interpretation and ultimate
implementation of an outer planets quarantine plan for probes.
CONTAMINATION PROBABILITY EVALUATION
An evaluation of probe contamination probability has established the
required level of initial bioburden reduction, both with and without heat
sterilization. Primary emphasis was placed on the Saturn/Uranus mission and
the results modified to reflect a Jupiter mission.
Saturn/Uranus
The probe contamination probability is evaluated by first establishing a
maximum allowable contamination allocation. An allocation is assumed, herein,
but its establishment is the prerogative of Dr. Lawrence B. Hall, the NASA
Planetary Quarantine Officer. Microbe survival probabilities and initial
bioburdens were then estimated and combined to yield a nominal prediction
for the planetary contamination probability. A comparison of these allowable
and predicted probabilities is made to identify the necessary bioload
reduction and to assess the need for heat sterilization and its form.
Contamination Allocation - A maximum allowable probe contamination
probability per mission was needed to provide a requirement against which the
subsequent estimates of actual probe contamination probability could be
compared. However, it was too early for the NASA to formally set such a re-
quirement for outer planet probe missions. Hence, a preliminary estimate was
made for purposes of this study.
The general approach to estimating a probe contamination allocation was to:
o Identify an overall contamination probability limit per mission (probe
plus spacecraft) from similar mission limits given in the NASA Planetary
Quarantine (P.Q.) Specification Book (Reference 3).
o Estimate the spacecraft contamination probability by modifying recent
Pioneer contamination analysis to reflect the increased impact
probability that results from targeting at the planet instead of
targeting for a flyby throughout.
o Determine the probe allocation by taking the difference between the
total mission limit and the spacecraft contamination contribution.
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The basic relationship used to determine probe allocation was:
PC/Mission = (PI x PC/I)SC + (PI x PC/I)PROBE = 1 x l0-4
where PI = Impact probability
PC/I = Contamination probability given impact
and
Pc/Mission = 1 x 10-4
(Pc/I)(SC) = 1.68 x 10-
4
(P I)PROBE = 1.0
therefore
(PC/I)PROBE = [1 x 10-4] - [1.68 x 10-4 x (P I)SC
The overall contamination probability limit of 1 x 10-4 is the Reference 3
value for the Pioneer 11 (Jupiter/Saturn) mission and was assumed to be valid
for all probe missions to either Saturn or Uranus. The value of PC/I(SC) was
taken directly from the (Reference 4) Pioneer analysis. The assumption of
unity for the probe impact probability reflects the basic intent of the probe
mission, i.e., to be captured by the planet.
Probe contamination allocation was therefore expressed in terms of
spacecraft impact probability. Both a target for flyby and a target at planet
condition were considered to assess the effect of targeting strategy on
contamination probability. A flyby impact probability of 6.21 x 10-3 is
used in the two midcourse correction trajectory analysis of Reference 4. The
impact probability for targeting at the planet was estimated in the following
manner.
PI(SC) (Target at Planet) = (PMI x PI/ ) + PM2/M1 + PM3/M2
where P = First maneuver failure probability = .0820
PI/I = Impact probability given first midcourse failure = .0691
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P2/M1  Second midcourse failure probability given first midcourse
success = .1220
PR3/M2 = Deflection maneuver failure probability given second midcourse
success = .1620
therefore
P I(SC) = .00566 + .1220 + .1620 = 2.897 x 10-1
It was assumed that the first midcourse maneuver would initiate targeting
at the planet. Hence, failure to accomplish the first midcourse would result
in a low impact probability. Failure of subsequent maneuvers, however, would
result in the continuation of a trajectory with a high probability of planetary
capture. An impact probability of unity was therefore assumed for these
subsequent maneuvers. Midcourse failure probabilities and first midcourse
impact probability were taken from Reference 4. Deflection failure probability
was estimated by linear extrapolation with number of manuevers. Note that
the PI(SC) was substantially greater than that for flyby targeting and
approximately equal to the sum of the failure probabilities of the maneuvers
following the first midcourse.
Incorporation of these spacecraft impact probabilities yielded the
following probe contamination allocations.
PC(PROBE) (TARGET FOR FLYBY) = 1.0 x 10-4 - 1.04 x 10
-6 = 9.9 x 10o-5
p C(PRBE) (TARGET AT PLANET) = 1.0 x 10-4 - 4.87 x 10
-5 
= 5.13 x 10-5PC(PROBE)
As shown, the target at planet strategy does reduce the allowable probe
allocation but not by a substantial amount. In the flyby case, almost all
of the mission PC can be allocated to the probe whereas targeting at the
planet results in a near equal apportionment of PC between spacecraft and
probe.
Survival Probability - The evaluation of probe microbe survivability
followed the analytical approach of Reference 4 with two key expansions.
First, the probe was considered as three parts; the multilayer insulation
9
(MLI) blanket, the ablative heat shield and the remainder or interior of the
probe. This subdivision, shown in Figure 1, allowed the potential variations
in microbe survivability at different probe locations to be considered. The
second expansion was to take into account the unique location of the outer
planet life zone compared to Earth and Mars. As shown in Figure 2, this zone
does not extend down to the surface (like Mars) but is suspended in the
atmosphere. These definitions are based on the work of Taylor, et. al, at the
Jet Propulsion Laboratory and appear in Reference 5. As a result, the probe
will pass through, but not take up, permanent residence in the life zone.
A somewhat modified approach to the assignment of microbe release probability
was therefore taken to reflect the beneficial impact of a transitory rather
than permanent penetration of the life zone.
PROBE MICROBE LOCATIONS
ABLATIVE HEAT SHIELDS
MULTILAYER
INSULATION (MLI)
BLANKET
PROBE INTERIOR
- STRUCTURE
- EQUIPMENT
Figure 1
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Results of the survivability analysis are summarized in Figure 3. As
indicated the space environment encountered during transit was estimated to
have little effect on microbe population. Similarly, entry radiation was
considered to have a negligible effect because there still is no firm evidence
of a significant trapped radiation belt around either Saturn or Uranus.
Entry temperature, however, is expected to noticeably affect bioload
survivability. The MLI value of 10-3 represents a nominal estimate and
equal to the overall microbial survivability on the Pioneer spacecraft
(Reference 4). However, values ranging from near unity to 1 x 10- 6 may be
possible depending on the manner in which the MLI is removed from the probe
and the ballistic coefficient of the resulting fragments. Although a
detailed analysis of this phenomenon was beyond the study scope, a sensitivity
assessment was conducted and is discussed in later paragraphs. The survival
probability of 1 x 10-4 microbes in the ablative material was used as a
conservative estimate. A discussion of the processes appears in the section
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MICROBE SURVIVAL/GROWTH PROBABILITY SATURN/URANUS PROBE
PROBE LOCATION
MULTILAYER
_ FACTOR INSULATION ABLATIVE INTERIOR
CDAPE CEkn11Tnnor rr
- 1 .L. L II V. IU I'I I
RTG RADIATION (S/C) 9 x 10-  1.0 1.0
UV RADIATION (NATURAL) 1.0 1.0 1.0
VACUUM-TEMPERATURE 1.0 1.0 1.0
SPACE TRANSIT (METEORS, ETC.) 1.0 1.0 1.0
FLYBY PLANET RADIATION 1.0 1.0 1.0
ENTRY ENVIRONMENT
RADIATION 1.0 1.0 1.0
TEMPERATURE 1 x 10-3  1 x 10-4  1.0
PLANETARY ENVIRONMENT
REMOVAL FROM PROBE 1.0 1 x 10-1 1 x 10- 5 *
SURVIVAL TO LIFE ZONE 1.0 1.0 1.0
DEPOSIT IN LIFE ZONE 1 x 10-1  1 x 10-1 1 x 10-1
GROWTH & REPLICATION 1 x 10-6  1 x 10- 6 1 x 10-6
9 x 10- 17 1 x 10 - 1 2  1 x 10- 12
*ESTIMATED PROBABILITY OF CATASTROPHIC STRUCTURAL BREAKUP OF PROBE ABOVE OR
WITHIN LIFE ZONE
Figure 3
on Minimization of Microbial Load. If bondline temperatures at entry
approach design values, the ablative would be completely sterilized.
The most significant survivability considerations are those associated
with the post entry or planetary environment. The factor, normally expressed
as a single release probability, is treated in three parts: the removal of
material containing microbes from the probe, their subsequent survival to the
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life zone, and the transfer or deposit of these microbes from the probe
material into the life zone. The probe removal probability for the non-
structural MLI is assumed to be unity while the value of 10-1 for ablative
material conservatively reflects the possibility that uncharred material
might be torn or broken off. The key factor, however, is the recognition
that microbes in the probe interior cannot be released unless a catastrophic
structural breakup occurs before the probe descends below the life zone in a
normal entry. The 10-5 removal probability for internal microbes is estimated
using current structural design safety margins and reflects a vented probe
design that minimizes differential pressure even at very high local ambient
pressures. A major uncertainty remains in the loads resulting from an off-
nominal entry trajectory. Hence, the sensitivity of the contamination prob-
ability to probe structural integrity is assessed in later paragraphs.
The probability of survival to the life zone is taken as unity. This
appears to be conservative for fragments removed from the probe before most
of the kinetic energy has been dissipated. However, there is not enough test
data (or analysis time) to justify a lower probability.
The consideration of depositing in the life zone essentially refers to
the number of microbes that may be removed from probe fragments as they pass
through the life zone and that can take up permanent residence there. While
some surface microbes might be removed by a scouring action of the atmosphere,
it is difficult to postulate a mechanism that transfers organisms that are
buried, either from inside equipment or between layers of MLI. Further,
natural convection currents in the atmosphere may cause recirculating of
deposited microbes to lower altitude, high temperature regions which inherently
create a natural sterilization process. Therefore, the 1 x 10-1 deposit
probability seems excessively conservative; further study by exobiologists
and atmospheric physicists is recommended.
The 1 x 10-6 probability of growth and replication was taken from the
preliminary P.Q. specification for Saturn and assumed applicable to Uranus.
This appears to be appropriate even though the PG for the more hospitable
environment of Mars is also 1 x 10-6 . Discussions with the Planetary Quarantine
Officer confirmed that this is appropos at this design stage; a one decade
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reduction on outer planet PG is a future possibility. However, for purposes
-6
of this study the conservatism associated with a 1 x 10 6 value was retained.
Initial Bioburden - The initial bioburden is estimated by determining
surface areas and nonmetallic volumes of each probe element (MLI, ablative,
interior) and applying a microbial density factor to each location. Both
the number of spores and of total microbes (spores plus vegetative organisms)
are estimated to allow eventual comparison of contamination probability with
and without heat sterilization. The data and results of this evaluation are
summarized in Figure 4.
INITIAL PROBE BIOBURDEN ESTIMATES
PROBE SPORE BIOBURDEN (1 X 105 MICROBES)
ELEMENT TYPE SIZE DENSITY SPORES* TOTAL**
MULTILAYER SURFACE AREA 2,107,000 cm2  .I/cm 2  2.11 21.1
INSULATION (MLI)
ABLATIVE HEAT SURFACE AREA 18,900 cm 2  .1/cm .02 .2
SHIELDS NONMETALLIC VOLUME 26,700 cm 15/cm 4.00 40.0
(4.-02) (40.2)
2 2INTERIOR SURFACE AREA 261,000 cm3  .1/cm 3  .26 2.6
NONMETALLIC VOLUME 81,000 cm3  15/cm3  12.15 121.5
ELECTRONICS VOLUME 7,000 cm 120/cm 8.40 84.
(20.81) (208.1)
AREA SUBTOTAL 2.39 23.9
VOLUME SUBTOTAL 24.55 245.55
GRAND TOTAL 26.94 269.4
* ASSUME SUBSEQUENT HEAT STERILIZATION CYCLE
** SPORES PLUS VEGETATIVE ORGANISMS; HEAT STERILIZATION NOT MANDATORY
Figure 4
The very large MLI area shown represents the total surface area of 32
layers of mylar plus 31 layers of nylon net separators. The size of the ablative
microbe locations includes both the forward and aft heat shields. Probe
interior areas are calculated from current probe drawings and include mated,
exposed and equipment internal surfaces. Equipment package internal surface
areas were estimated to be twice the external surface area of the package.
Interior nonm etallic volumes are also determined from probe layouts and
include the actual volume of insulation and fiberglass honeycomb structure.
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The volume of electronic piece parts inside science and subsystem equipment
is estimated from total package weights.
A nominal microbial density for surface areas of 0.1 spores/cm2 is used
at the recommendation of the Exotech Systems Inc. The nominal density for
nonmetallic volumes of 15 spores/cm3 was established by assuming the midpoint
of the microbial density range given in P.Q. Specification Sheet Number IV-2.
(See Reference 3). The 120 spores/cm3 nominal density that is applied to the
electronics volume represents 80% of the maximum value shown on Reference 3,
Sheet IV-2. A greater than midpoint density was selected to compensate for
a still indeterminate volume estimation. Total bioburdens (spores plus
vegetatives) were estimated by assuming that spores comprise 10% of the total
bioload. A total bioburden estimate was included so that elimination of
protracted heat sterilization could be considered. Limiting the bioburden
to spores alone essentially assumes a subsequent heat sterilization cycle
to inactivate the large number of more heat sensitive, vegetative organisms
(Reference 3, Section V).
A comparison of estimated probe bioburden with the measured.bioloads of
actual spacecraft is presented in Figure 5. As indicated, the bioload of the
probe interior alone is greater than for either Pioneer or Mariner. Considering
the relatively small size of the probe, this indicates an inherent conservatism
in the probe estimating procedures. Further analysis is included in Appendix A.
Contamination Probability - The probability of contamination of the probe
was calculated and compared with the contamination allocation to identify the
degree of bioload reduction required and to assess the need for heat sterilization.
A summary of the basic probability data used is shown in Figure 6 for both a heat
sterilization (spore bioburden) and a nonheat sterilization (total bioburden)
case. The basic relationship used to calculate contamination probability was
PC = 1. - (-PSG)n
where PC = contamination probability
PSG = microbe survival/growth probability
n = initial number of microbes
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INITIAL BIOBURDEN COMPARISON
o NO HEAT STERILIZATION
o TOTAL BIOLOAD (SPORES AND VEGETATIVES)
APPLICATION BIOBURDEN
PROBE - MLI 2.11 x 106
ABLATIVE 4.02 x 106
INTERIOR - VOLUME 2.08 x 107
- AREA 2.6 x 105
(2t.7T1 x0 7)
MARINER 8 (H)* 1.2 x 104
MARINER 9 (MM'71)* 3.1 x 104
PIONEER 10 (F) 1.4 x 104
PIONEER 11 (G) 2.5 x 105
*REFERENCE 6
Figure 5
Derivation of the values for PSG' n, and the PC allocation were discussed in
previous paragraphs. As indicated in Figure 6, the anticipated value of PC
is below the contamination allocation if only spores are considered but
exceeds this allocation if a total microbe bioburden is used. Further, the MLI
contamination contribution is a dominant factor; the PC of the ablative and
interior elements are below the allocation even in the total bioload case.
This indicates that MLI bioload reduction procedures are needed to deactivate the
vegetative organisms. A one decade reduction of MLI spores might also be
desirable to achieve a more comfortable margin. Similarly, some reduction in
probe interior vegetative organisms would provide a larger margin between a
current specification-based prediction and an allowable contamination
probability. However, this probe interior reduction may be possible without
resorting to long, high temperature sterilization procedures that adversely
affect equipment design. This is discussed in the section on microbial load
minimization.
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PROBE CONTAMINATION PROBABILITY ESTIMATES
(SATURN/URANUS PC ALLOCATION = 5.13 x 10-5)
PROBE ELEMENT P SPORE BIOBURDEN* TOTAL BIOBURDEN**SGn P n P
C C
MULTILAYER 9 x 10- 2.11 x 105 1.90 x 10-5  2.11 x 106  1.86 x 10-4
INSULATION
(MLI)
ABLATIVE 1 x 10-12 4.02 x 105  4.02 x 10-7  4.02 x 10
6  4.02 x 10-6
HEAT SHIELDS
INTERIOR 1 x 10-12 2.08 x 106  2.08 x 10-6  2.0 x 10
7  2.08 x 10-5
TOTAL PROBE 2.11 x 10
-5  2.11 x 10-4
CONTAMINATION PROBABILITY:
* SUBSEQUENT HEAT STERILIZATION REQUIRED
** HEAT STERILIZATION NOT MANDATORY
Figure 6
The sensitivity of this nominal PC estimate to the key PSG factors of MLI
entry survivability and probe structural integrity was also assessed. The results
are presented in Figures 7 and 8,respectively. The MLI data shows that (A) if a
worst case assumption of near unity entry PSG is made, an additional spore bio-
load reduction of 3 decades would be needed. However, (B) a slightly greater than
two decade reduction in the entry PSG would essentially eliminate the need for
any special sterilization procedures. The structural integrity assessment
indicates that if a more conservative, 5a structural relative to catastrophic
breakup were assumed, about a factor of 33 reduction in interior spore bioload
would be realized. This is still a much less severe requirement than the 8 to
12 decade reduction that is understood to be the Viking goal. However, a one
decade lower probability of structural breakup would provide sufficient
contamination margin to remove any consideration of reducing the number of
17
CONTAMINATION SENSITIVITY TO MLI ENTRY SURVIVAL PROBABILITY
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Figure 7
vegetative organisms in the probe interior. Hence, it appears that the results
of a more detailed analysis would range from a mild application of heat steril-
ization to complete elimination of heat sterilization.
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CONTAMINATION SENSITIVITY TO PROBE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY
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Jupiter
The evaluation of a Jupiter probe contamination probability was made in
the same manner as that previously discussed for Saturn/Uranus. The results,
summarized in Figure 9, reflect changes in contamination allocation and
survival probabilities that were unique to a Jupiter mission. The slightly
higher probe contamination allocation is the total mission allocation for the
Pioneer/Jupiter mission (Reference 3, Sheet VI-2). Spacecraft contribution
to contamination was negligible because of its low, 2.7 x 10-7 value of PC/I
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PROBE CONTAMINATION PROBABILITY EVALUATION
(JUPITER)
o ALLOWABLE PROBE PC/MISSION = 6.4 x 10- 5 = 1 -1 - PSG)n
SURVIVAL PROBABILITY (PSG) MLI ABLATIVE INTERIOR
SPACE - RTG RADIATION 9 x 10-1 1.0 1.0
ENTRY - RADIATION 1 x lO-5 1.0 1.0
- TEMPERATURE 1 x 10-lO3 1 x 0-4 1.0
PLANET - REMOVAL FROM PROBE 1.0 1 x 10-1 l x 10-5
- DEPOSIT IN LIFE ZONE 1 x 10- 1 1 x 10- 1 1 x 10
- GROWTH AND REPLICATION 1 x 10- 6 1 x 10-6 1 x 10-6
TOTAL 9 x 10-16 1 x 10- 1 2 1 x 1O-2
INITIAL BIOBURDEN n , (105 MICROBES)
SPORES 2.11 4.02 20.81
TOTAL 21.1 40.2 208.1
CONTAMINATION PROBABILITY (PC)
SPORES BIOBURDEN 1.90 x 10-10 4.02 x 10-7  2.08 x 10-l6
TOTAL BIOBURDEN 1.90 x 10 4.02 x 10-6  2.08 x 10-5
Figure 9
(Reference 7). The MLI survival probability was reduced by a factor of
10-5 because of the biocidal effect of the Jovian trapped radiation belt. The
resulting probe contamination probability is within the allocation for both
spore and total bioburdens and is significantly less than the Saturn/Uranus
estimates. Hence, no special, bioload reduction provisions, such as heat
sterilization, appear necessary for a Jupiter probe.
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MINIMIZATION OF MICROBIAL LOAD
Current planetary quarantine standards require microbiological control in
the construction of outer planetary probes. These efforts can be time consuming
and can breed costly paperwork in tracking parts to completion. It is
pated that some relaxation in these standards may be forthcoming, or that alter-
nate procedures may be adopted to satisfy the standards without the required
overkill currently in effect.
For example, the major contribution of microbial contaminants from the cur-
rent probe design to outer planets will arise from flaking or chipping of the
multilayer insulation (MLI) during entry. This particular component can be heat
sterilized to assure that contamination due to organisms on an inner layer of
the MLI does not occur. It is also possible to reduce its load by irradiation.
Regardless of whether the final probe assembly will be required to undergo
heat sterilization or some form of heat-irradiation sterilization, a knowledge
of the microbial burden on the probe is required. If no final treatment is re-
quired, the microbial load must be known to be less than a predetermined maximum
load. If a final bioload reduction is required, by either heat or heat-irradia-
tion, the microbial load must be known to dictate the amount of treatment re-
quired to obtain the desired degree of microbial load reduction. This microbial
burden can be determined only by monitoring of the probe components during as-
sembly and by enumeration of the surface load of the finally assembled probe.
Minimization Methods
Minimization of the total microbial load during fabrication is needed to
make estimation practical. If no final heat or heat-irradiation treatment is
required, minimum numbers must be attained at final assembly in order to assure
planetary quarantine by design practices only. For example, the maximum allow-
able bioload (spores) which would not contaminate the target planet is
estimated to be 3 x 105 to prevent contamination for an unsterilized probe.
Monitoring in this instance would include the determination of total microbial
flora. That is, both vegetative cells and spores would have to be counted.
If a final heat treatment is specified, the microbial load must be known
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in order to use the shortest possible terminal sterilization cycle in order to
minimize heat and/or radiation damage to components and to minimize the elapsed
time required for the treatment. In addition, only total spore counts would be
required during assembly and of the finally assembled probe. This results from
the fact that vegetative cells are more readily killed by the final treatment
than are the bacterial spores. By the time the spores are killed all vegetative
cells would have been killed anyway, regardless of their numbers. This charac-
teristic can be employed to eliminate all vegetatives by a short duration, low
temperature heat cycle whose sole purpose is reduction of assay time. Figure
10 itemizes the currently applied elements in a sterilization program and an
alternate (I) that cleanses a probe with only one cycle used as a vegetative
removal procedure.
MINIMIZATION OF BIOLOAD DURING MANUFACTURE
PRESENT -------- STANDARDS - - ALTERNATE
DRY HEAT: REPEATED STERILIZATION DECONTAMINATION PLUS 1
REDUCTIONS ('4) HEAT CYCLE OR HEAT-RADIATION
BAGGED WITH REMOVAL HANDLING BAGGED:--REMOVAL ALWAYS IN
IN (UN)CONTROLLED CONTROLLED ENVIRONMENT:
ENVIRONMENT LAMINAR FLOW BENCH; UV
IRRADIATION
MIXTURE OF NORMAL AND ASSEMBLY AREA ALL ASSEMBLY WORK IN LAMINAR
CLASS 100,000 ROOM FLOW BENCH
DEFINED FOR CLEAN WORK ATTIRE CAP, SUIT AND GLOVES WHILE
ROOM ONLY ASSEMBLING
COMPONENTS, SPECIFIED MONITORING & ASSAYING COMPONENTS, SPECIFIED SURFACES
SURFACES AND COUPONS AND COUPONS; ROOM CHECK
FREQUENCY: TWICE WEEKLY
UNKNOWN PROCEDURE DECONTAMINATION USUALLY HIGH LEVELS WIPED WITH
90% ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL OR ETHYLENE OXIDE
IN DIMETHYL SULFOXIDE PENETRANT
SWABBED, CULTURED AND FINAL SAMPLING SWABBED CULTURED AND ENUMERATED
ENUMERATED BIOLOAD BIOLOAD
ASSEMBLY, BIOSHIELDING OPERATIONS ASSEMBLY, BIOSHIELDING AT
AT PLANT WITH RTG PLANT WITH ALL REPAIR AND
INSTALLATION AND RECYCLING AT PLANT
RECYCING TSC AT KSC
Figure 10
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Probe Assembly Minimization Procedures - In order to minimize but properly moni-
tor the microbial burden during probe assembly the following procedures are
recommended. They are not costly and are believed to be the necessary minimum
to maintain cleanliness required (minimize microbial burdens) and to lessen the
work load of the microbiologist in monitoring. The monitoring requirements
throughout serve two purposes: The first is to determine the final load on the
probe; the second, and equally important, to insure that microbial burdens do
not increase at unexpected rates during assembly due to laxity in cleanliness
procedures or in acceptance of unusually contaminated components. If components
are determined to be excessively contaminated, last minute changes in the final
sterilization cycle or the establishment of other emergency remedial measures
would be instituted. The following concept (Alternative II) is recommended:
o All assembly work is to be contained in an environment that meets class
100,000 room specifications, i.e., having no more than 100,000 particles
per ft3 greater in size than 5 microns.
o Unwrapping of components for assembly and all assembly of components to
the probe are to be conducted in a microbiological, laminar-flow bench
which provides sufficient personnel working space yet does not allow the
probe itself to be in contact with ambient air.
o Cap, suit, and gloves are to be worn by persons working in the laminar-
flow probe assembly area.
o During nonworking hours high intensity ultraviolet lighting is to be
used to flood the entire assembly room. This will daily reduce the load
of microorganisms which build up on exposed surfaces during working hours.
o On receipt of a component in the assembly room, it is thoroughly swabbed
for its surface microbial load as described in the procedure presented
as,Appendix B. After swabbing, the component will be placed in sterile
wrapping material described in procedure given in Appendix C and stored,
until its assembly time. Components having excessively high levels of
contamination could be wiped down with 90% isopropyl alcohol to reduce
their microbial burden, or with a mixture of ethylene oxide and dimethyl
sulfoxide to render them sterile. (Dimethyl sulfoxide is a very effec-
tive penetrant.)
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o Just prior to assembly each component is treated with high intensity
ultraviolet irradiation within the laminar flow hood. For most compo-
nents a turn-table or rotisserie is to be provided. At mating, both
mated surfaces are swabbed to determine their microbial burden and, if
the load is excessively high, the unit will be cleaned by one of the
above-mentioned methods and rechecked.
o Twice weekly swab samples are to be obtained in the assembly room and
under the assembly hood to ascertain that cleanliness procedures are
being maintained in the general work area.
o The finally assembled probe is to be thoroughly sampled prior to instal-
lation of a bioshield or ground handling cover to determine its final
launch load or to specify the degree of final heat or heat-irradiation
treatment.
A final sterilization cycle consists of either dry heat alone at 113 0 C or dry
heat (at 105'C) combined with high energy gamma irradiation. Sandia Labora-
tories has shown a savings of both time of exposure and temperature level is
obtained using this simultaneous exposure technique. This latter possibility
can be implemented at a nominal cost to the probe development and fabrication
program. The relatively small size of the probe makes a gamma radiation
installation manageable (see also Synergistic Effects of Thermoradiation).
If indeed a final heat or heat-irradiation treatment is conducted, the
degree of microbiological monitoring could be reduced by about 30% since only
total spore counts, and not total bacterial counts, need be conducted.
Ultraviolet Radiation Sterilization - Manufacturing of the probe can take advan-
tage of the bactericidal application of ultraviolet radiation to reduce the
probe bioburden daily. A commercial mercury vapor lamp located above the work
area can be operated during off-hours of the probe assembly period to keep bac-
teria growth in check and, thereby, keep bioburden below the limits to be
specified for surface and mated surfaces.
Ultraviolet radiation between 180 and 300 nanometers destroys bacteria,
mold yeast, and virus. Because of the absorption in the ozone layer of Earth's
upper atmosphere, virtually none of this short-wave length solar radiationo
reaches the surface. Radiation at 2650 A (265 nm) produces the optimal bacter-
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icidal rates according to the Illuminating Engineering Society (Reference 8).
Most commercial ultraviolet bactericidal lamps operate with a peak output at
0 0
2537 A, a wavelength that is only 85% as effective as 2650 A. Lamps of this
type with or without quartz glass are usable.
The bactericidal effectiveness of ultraviolet radiation results from the
absorption of radiant energy by nuclear protein, the vital part of the bacteria,
after transmission through air, water and the ordinary protein of the bacteria.
In contrast, theoretically more lethal energy, such as x-rays and gamma radia-
tion (higher frequency), passes through the organism with little absorption and
little killing action. Radiation at 253.7 nanometers is unique in its biocidal
action without objectionable heating or photochemical effects.
In practice, the radiations are generated by passage of an electric arc
through low pressure mercury vapor enclosed in a special glass that is capable
of transmitting 95% of the emitted light in the 253.7 nm band. To inhibit the
growth of organisms,an incident energy level in the range of 103 to 2 x 103 W-
sec/cm2 for yeasts and 5 x 103 to 1.3 x 105 pW-sec/cm 2 for mold spores is
required. Because the lamps are made in sizes equivalent to standard fluores-
cent tubes (with some modifications required in the ballasts), installations in
all classes of clean rooms and work areas are readily achievable. In use, the
lamps are to be used only when harm to the workers is impossible. Thus, pack-
aged components or rolls of the multilayer insulation material would be used in
light-tight boxes to lower spore counts at intervals. Times of use are before
bagging for storage in the assembly area, after removal, before mating,
and during off-hours of production of the full assembly. Standard practices of
the U.S. Health Service and the American Medical Association would be invoked
especially to screening, locking-out, and performing emergency treatments to
prevent accidental eye or erythemal effects. As recommended in Reference 7, all
bactericidal lamps would be checked periodically for ultraviolet output to make
certain that their biocidal effectiveness is maintained. Direct assaying of the
irradiated surfaces is required periodically to assure adequacy of treatments.
The lamps work most efficiently in still warm air so direct cooling of the
lamps would be precluded. A decrease in UV output of one-fourth to one-third
occurs if room temperatures drop from 800 F to 400 F. Some lamps are specially
made for air conditioning ducts and are suited to use in a laminar flow bench
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installation. Because all assembly operations are contemplated for controlled
temperature-humidity conditions, surface reductions in microbe count vary only
as a function of distance from the lamp and focussing of all emitted energy by
reflectance on a part or portion of the probe.
A secondary beneficial effect of standard bactericidal lamps is the produc-
tion of ozone which in the presence of moisture serves as a bactericide and a
fungicide. The lethal exposure of an organism is determined by its susceptibil-
ity, the wavelength of radiation, the density of radiant flux (watts/cm2 ) and
the time of exposure. Values for susceptibility for different bacillus and
spores have been determined with an upper level in the order of 105 to 106 1W
sec/cm 2 (%lW-sec/cm2 ) for a 90% (1 decade) destruction of virulent spores. Con-
tinued exposure produces additional decade reductions.
For example, if an open table top 6 ft x 8 ft is used and a standard lamp
(G64T6) is centered 7 ft above, such that a 5 ft lamp axis is parallel to the
8 ft side (no point further away from the lamp than 7 1/2 ft), the 253.7 nm
source produces an incident power density at any point 1 meter away of 150 PW/
2
cm . Since energy density reduces as the square of the distance, a killing load
of 30 pW/cm2 will exist on the surface. A single decade reduction in microbe
count results every 4400 sec (1.22 hr). If turned on after working hours (in-
cluding plant maintenance periods) a 10 decade decrease is conceivable every
night for all illuminated surfaces. Alternative utilizations include installa-
tion of lamps in laminar flow benches over its work surface or in the duct work.
In the latter instance the microbial load of the air and dust remaining are con-
tinuously sterilized. An adaptation of this is a possibility of utilizing a
heat generation laser to vaporize air-borne particles and microbes. UV irradi-
ation is currently used in the sugar and bottling industries to keep materials
and equipment sterile once this state has been achieved. In general, it is not
practical to use the radiant energy to clean or decontaminate a dirty, greasy or
sticky surface.
Synergistic Effects of Thermoradiation - The effectiveness of sterilization of
a spacecraft has been shown by workers at the Sandia Laboratories to be enhanced
by combined exposure to heat and radiation. Therefore, components prohibited
from use because of unacceptable performance after protracted exposure to a
temperature of 113 0 C (and 125C for qualification tests) may be used because
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durations are radically reduced. Exposure to gamma radiation does not of itself
substitute one difficult environment for another because radiation hardening
(so-called) must be exercised for probes entering the Jovian planets. The radi-
ation level used in the sterilization procedure is moderate, 150 Krad.
The technique, as it evolved, employed a cobalt 60 source with collimated
emissions directed at a rotating probe or component. For another spacecraft, a
revetment at Kennedy Space Center would have been used to protect personnel
while the spacecraft was turned on a table. The method, as described in Refer-
ence 9, had two difficulties which were not fully resolved. First, the entire
activity had to be located near the launch site to minimize handling after
sterilization. Second, the large Viking lander capsule made the job of heating
and irradiating simultaneously difficult. A relatively inexpensive set-up was
proposed whose cost was expected to be about $125,000 in 1970. A third drawback
to adopting the procedure lay in the fact that the lander capsule might have to
be sterilized at the fabricator's plant.
Many of the problems associated with its implementation relate to size.
The probe is of a dimension that a hole in the floor or an oven-sized container
can be built to provide the environment.
The benefits of the method are illustrated in Figure 11 which is drawn from
Reference 10. Dry heat alone has a decade reduction time of D = 12 hours at this
temperature (D = 5 hours for buried microbes at 125%C). When the same standard
spore was sterilized at 11 krad/hr, a D-value of 7 hours was determined by
test. The lower curve illustrates that when combined a synergistic inactivation
occurs which is more than twice as effective as when the two are added together.
The resultant value of D = 2.28 hours indicates a benefit at a temperature below
boiling temperature that takes just 0.19 times the time to dry heat sterilize.
Variations on the testing showed that the most effective temperature is about
105'C and that the stresses need to be applied simultaneously. The method ap-
pears to be feasible and practical, however, some testing of components is re-
quired in design and development phases to validate the method with actual hard-
ware and to qualify the equipment. If the planet Saturn is proven to possess
trapped radiation particles in numbers nearly equivalent to those of Jupiter,
this type of radiant exposure will be a requirement for testing for radiation
susceptibility of the equipment.
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COMPARISON OF THE INACTIVATION OF BACILLUS SUBTILIS
VAR. NIGER SPORES WITH GAMMA RADIATION, DRY HEAT AT
950 C, AND THERMORADIATION
RADIATION DOSE - krads
!08 33 66 99 132 165 198 231 264 297 330
10 6 -DRY HEAT AT 95oC
°105 RADIATION AT
11 krad/hr; D = 7 hrs
10 -
3 SYNERGISTIC10 INACTIVATION
102
101
THERMORADIATION @ 11 krad/hr & 950C
D = 2.28 hrs
0.0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
Figure 11
The probe can be designed to the stresses of heat sterilization alone; it
could also be designed to the combined stresses of heat and radiation. Radia-
tion alone is not advocated as a final sterilization cycle because the effects
of long exposure are not known. Another aspect of the synergism is that heat
is employed to anneal radiated parts; combining the two would assist
in this annealing process.
Heat Shield Fabrication 
- The heat shield of the probe is made of an ablative
material which deposits carbonaceous vapor and particles in the atmosphere dur-
ing and just after peak heating. This contamination is initially so hot that
no biological specimens trapped in it can survive. As the outer layer recedes,
the inner material does rise in temperature but not instantly nor completely to
auto sterilization temperatures. However, the high heat capacity of the known
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low molecular weight gases in their atmospheres, results in a very rapid de-
crease in surface temperature (down to lO0-2000K) as subsonic velocities are
attained. If the cooling results in severe cracking from the gradients pro-
duced, some flaking or spalling can occur. For this reason the heat shield is
considered a potential or possible source of biological contamination, even
though bondline temperatures do climb to 600°F (8000 F design).
The fabrication of the heat shields involve many heating cycles which gen-
erally range in temperature from 930C to 177 0C. This can kill the vegetative
microbes in an amount to about 90% of the total normal terrestrial loads. Full
credit cannot be taken, however, for the multiple heatings because of particul-
ate contamination caused by successive machinings after each assembly step.
The final curing can be considered as a partial component sterilization cycle
of the assembly because the bonding of the aluminum structural shell to the
honeycomb can be followed by bagging and desiccating to protect it from dust and
other nutrients. The 930C shown in Figure 12 is a standard operating tempera-
SUAEP HEAT SHIELD FABRICATION PROCESSES
ENG. DRAWING (NO. & TITLE) OPERATION PROPOSED ALTERNATE COMMENTS
70A132010-FORWARD ABLATOR 1) FABRICATE CARBON-PHENOLIC 10 HRS @ 163*C
SUBASSEMBLY (MMS-516) HEATSHIELD & LAMINATES
(2) BOND C/P PIN TO C/P HEAT- 45 MIN. @ 93*C 60 MIN. @ 177°C
SHIELD WITH HT-424 EPOXY- +90 MIN. @ 121C
PHENOLIC ADHESIVE PER P.S. 14140 +60 MIN. 9 149*C
+60 MIN. @ 177*C
70A132040-FORWARD (1) BOND PHENOLIC/GLASS (P/G) 45 MIN. 9 93°C
HEATSHIELD ASSEMBLY HONEYCOMB & P/G PRE-PREG TO C/P +90 MIN. @ 121*C
HEATSHIELD WITH HT-424 EPOXY- +60 MIN. @ 149C
PHENOLIC ADHESIVE PER P.S. 14140. +60 MIN. @ 177 0C
(NOTE 3 STATES TO MACHINE CORE 120 MIN. @ 93C POSSIBLY ELIMINATE
AFTER BONDING-CONTAM. PROBLEM) 120 MIN. 9 121*C MACHINING BY USING H/C
120 MIN. @ 149*C POST CURE] PROCURED TO SIZE.
120 MIN. 9 177*C
120 MIN. 9 2040C
70A1I33001-PROBE (1) BOND WITH FM 123 PER P.S. 1 HR @ 107-132*C
STRUCTURE ASSEMBLY 11308 (DRAWING CALL-OUT IN- "X" HOURS @ ACCOMPLISH ONE STERILIZATION
ADEQUATE; -2 OR -5 MATERIAL) CURE TEMP. CYCLE BY EXTENDING TIME IN
BOND FORWARD HEATSHIELD OVEN
ASSEMBLY TO STRUCTURE
70A133010-AFT HEATSHIELD (1) BOND P/G HONEYCOMB & P/G 45 MIN. @ 93*C
ASSEMBLY PRE-PREG TOGETHER WITH HT- +90 MIN. @ 121*C.
424 EPOXY-PHENOLIC ADHESIVE +60 MIN. @ 1490C
PER P.S. 14140. +60 MIN. @ 177*C
(2) APPLY ULD ELASTOMERIC + POST CURE
ABLATOR & MACHINE TO FINAL 1 HR @ 930C "X" HOURS @ 1100C PROCURE PRECUT H/C
CONTOUR (CONTAM. PROBLEM) TO SIZE TO ELIMINATE
MACHINING
70A138020-INSULATION (1) BOND INTERNAL INSULATION
INSTALLATION-INTERNAL WITH EC 2216 PER P.S. 11308,
TYPE XIV 3-7 DAYS 9 25*C 60 MIN. 9 930C
OR HIGHER
70A138041-AFT COVER (1) MAKE H402 FREON BLOWN
INSULATION ASSEMBLY FOAM PARTS (URETHANE) ROOM TEMP.
(2) BOND FOAM TO STRUCTURE (25*C)
WITH EC 2216 PER P.S. 11308,
TYPE XIV 3-7 DAYS 9 25*C 60 MIN. 9 93*C
OR HIGHER Figure 12
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ture in current manufacturing practice. It is not an upper bound; the cure
temperature can be elevated to 105 0C or O110C thereby making it fully usable in
specifying quarantine requirements. Again, cleanliness after the heat cycles
is of paramount importance in these procedures.
The asseumbly steps for the fore and aft heat shields are explained diagram-
matically in Figures 13 and 14. This particular assembly plays the prime role
in preventing biological contamination in the planetary atmospheres, therefore,
final producibility engineering must place top emphasis on strength after ex-
posure to peak heating and on processing that promotes self-sterilization.
PROBE FORWARD HEAT SHIELD ASSEMBLY
FABRICATE MACHI NE C/ P  FILL GROOVES IN LAY-UP P/G PRE-PREG-
CARBON-PHENOLIC HEATSHIELD HEATSHIELD WITH .2 LAYERS OF HT-424 FILM
HEATSHIELD TO CONTOUR; CARBON FELT ADHESIVE AND P/G HONEY-CUT GROOVES COMB; BOND TOGETHER
MACHINE - HONEYCOMB FILL HONEYCOMB BOND FORWARD HEATSHIELD (P/C &
TO REQUIRED THICKNESS WITH OPACIFIED POWDER FILLED H/C TO PROBE
-AFTER BONDING PER POWDER STRUCTURAL ASSEMBLY 70A13301
70A132040 WITH FM-123-2 ADHESIVE
(1 HR @ 107 0 -132°C)
ABLATOR
CARBON-PHENOLIC HEATSHIELD
- HT-424 ADHESIVE (BOTH SIDES OF LAMINATE)
FIBERGLASS-PHENOLIC LAMINATE
------------IBERGLASS-PHENOLIC HONEYCOMB
FM-123-2.ADHESIVE
CONE 7075-T7351
Figure 13
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SATURN-URANUS-JUPITER PROBE
AFT HEATSHIELD
FABRICATE PHENOLIC- BOND ABLATIVE FILL H/C WITH ELAST-
GLASS (P/G) HONEYCOMB HONEYCOMB (H/C) TO OMERIC ABLATION MAT'L
AND LAMINATE ASSEMBLY P/G STRUCTURE AND AND MACHINE TO FINAL
70A133010 PER P.S. 14140 POST CURE ASSEMBLY DIMENSIONS
ELAST(MERIC ABLATOR
HT-424 FILM ADHESIVE
FIBERGLASS LAMINATE
PHENOLIC-GLASS HONEYCOMB
Figure 14
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ENTRY CONTAMINATION MECHANISMS
A probe mission to be successful in the atmospheric descent must be
targeted at the aim point that produces a predictable environment. The planet's
high rotation speeds aid in reducing relative velocity and decelerations. The
entry corridor must be of a size that the aim point plus 3a uncertainties fall
within the corridor. The corridor is bounded by the extremes in atmospheric models
and the entry angles anticipated. The first is arbitrarily defined based on our
limited knowledge of the gross planetary abundances and postulated diurnal con-
ditions; the second is independently selected after consideration of scientific
objectives, transit vehicle limitations, and probe design capabilities.
The corridors for which this probe is designed are presented in Figure 15.
Note that the probe is structurally designed to survive entry when deceleration
loads are less than 800 gE's. (A 5a structure l000g E ultimate loading).
o For Jupiter gmax <1000 when y <-14' for all currently defined atmospheres
(including A. J. Kliore's definition based on Pioneer 10 occultations).
o For Saturn and Uranus gmax <1000 for Ys < -52' and YU < -670 in the NASA
Cool Model atmospheres.
The probe will fail structurallyin Cool atmospheres at all angles steeper
than those defined. For entries into Nominal and Warm Models gmax < 1000 at all
entry path angles up to vertical entry. Failure due to excessive g-forces can
produce biological contamination if the interior bioburden is high and the debris
does not burn up. Metallic items will melt but ablator protected metal com-
ponents probably will not.
Growth and replication are dependent on the requirements itemized by Taylor,
et. al. in Reference 5. The nutritional requirements of bacteria is quoted in
the reference as divided into 4 categories: (1) carbon source, (2) energy source,
(3) salts, and (4) water. The authors' evaluation indicate that of all outer
planets and satellites the highest probability (not quantified) of growth exists
in Saturn's atmosphere with Jupiter having a lower likelihood. The differentiation
is based on availability of liquid water and relatively high concentrations of
nutrients. Titan is ranked next and all other satellites are ranked very low in
growth potential. Uranus was not ranked but a cursory examination indicates a
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low probability based on the lower probability of encountering water, ammonia
and carbonaceous compounds at Uranus. In general, the relative abundance of
these compounds is about one-fourth that of Saturn. Because of its distance
from the sun, the energy available also is about one-fourth that at Saturn's
radius. Thus, the potential for life-support appears to be highest at Saturn
with Jupiter, Titan and Uranus following it in precedence.
STRUCTURAL LOAD ENVELOPES
STRUCTURAL ULTIMATE LOAD LIMIT
1000 - - ^ - 2
JUPITER/
9001- . -COOL .
I MODELS--,
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LUj 800
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700 
-
500 -
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400
600-
100-
li-i
300 U RN U
200 -
100 -- 7-
- WARM MODELS
(REF. NASA SP-8069, -8091, & -8103)
0 I I I I
0 -10 -20 -30 -40 -50 -60 -70 -80 -90
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Another aspect of Uranus as a target planet that must be weighed is the
currently large ephemeris uncertainties. Reference 1 states that these errors
cause 3a variations in entry angle of +15.850. Thus, a Uranus aim limitation
of -370 would have to be imposed to prevent exceeding the 800 gE design limit
by entry dispersions.
Survivability Boundary
Analyses by Swenson, Reference 11 , showed that for a given material
specific heat capacity, shock layer radiative heating completely could
destroy large bodies while convective heating from the boundary layer can destroy
small bodies. The degree of overlap from these two destructive heating
mechanisms depends primarily upon the heat capacity of the body material
and entry flight path angle. Swenson, in Reference 11 has defined sizes of
survival based on specific heat capacity and body gravity of the falling object.
The survival range for ablator covered probes is in the range of 7 to 30 MJ/kg
with a radius of the order of 0.5 to 1 m and specific gravity of 0.2.
The entry probe for Saturn/Uranus entry has a 45 cm radius and a specific
gravity that varies from 0.45 to 0.42 as it ablates (a Jupiter probe would
vary from 0.66 to 0.44). The probes have a major diameter of 0.89 m so they
appear to fall just outside of the survivability region defined in Reference
11, Figure 6 for Jupiter entries. The heat capacity of this probe is calcu-
lated to be 28.5 MJ/kg at 3900 0K, the predicted peak temperature for a
Uranus cool entry. The crossmark in Figure 16 shows the locus of the SUAEP
relative to the Swenson definitions. The design is therefore marginal and
will require extensive testing to assure thermal integrity.
In Saturn or Uranus entries the relative amounts of radiative to total
heat flux are illustrated in Figure 17. The planetary heat pulses are
characterized in all cases with high radiative heat fluxes. The magnitude
actually encountered is strongly influenced by the initial entry angle and the
real atmospheric characteristics. In the analytical process the steep
entries into Saturn and Uranus cool atmospheres approximate the peak flux
generated in a Jupiter Nominal atmosphere model at an angle of -7.50. However,
the total heat input in Jupiter is greater even though a low angle is planned.
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PROBE SURVIVABILITY
FAILURE ANALYSIS
SOURCE MODE SOLUTION
o PROBE OUTSIDE DESIGN o STRUCTURAL.FAILS; PROBE o WIDEN BOUNDARIES;
BOUNDARIES UNSTABLE INCREASE STRENGTH
o UNCERTAINTY IN HEAT- o HEAT SHIELD UNBONDS; o ADD MATERIAL TO RAISE
ING OR DEGRADED PER- SHIELD BREAKS AWAY MARGIN OF SAFETY
FORMANCE OF HEAT SHIELD
o PROBE STRUCTURE HEATS o ALUMINUM MELTS; STRUC- o SUBSTITUTE TITANIUM
UP DEEP IN ATMOSPHERE TURE COLLAPSES
o PIECES OF MLI SURVIVE o MLI ON AFTERBODY PRO- o REDESIGN INSULATION
ENTRY TECTED DURING PEAK ON AFTERBODY
HEATING
SURVIVABILITY BOUNDARY - JUPITER
AVERAGE BODY SPECIFIC GRAVITY = 0.5
1 D
FURVIVAL 5OUNiDARY
(RADIATIVE + CONVECTIVE)
-NONSURVIVABLE
CONVECTIVE <:
S--HEATING ONLY SURVIVABLE
-50 REGION
-15O/ +
oNONSURVIVABLE ,
U RADIATIVE -45
SHEATING ONLY /
S0.1 - INERTIAL ENTRY
/ ANGLE " --
0.0I I ,
0.1 1 0 100
SPECIFIC HEAT CAPACITY (MJ/kg)
Figure 16
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TOTAL HEAT FLUXES IN TYPICAL PLANETARY ENTRIES
. NO BLOWING
* STAGNATION POINT
SHALLOW - JUPITER STEEP - URANUS STEEP - SATURN
NOMINAL ATMOSPHERE COOL ATMOSPHERE COOL ATMOSPHERE
YI = -7.5o YI = -500 = -400
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Figure 17
The high heating rate for Uranus is due to the large proportion of helium
specified in the control document (Reference 12). The large helium to-hydrogen
ratio (60:31 for the Cool model) cause high deceleration loads, stagnation
pressures, shock layer temperatures, and thermal radiation fluxes. The
integrity of the carbon phenolic at the heat fluxes and temperatures (up to
4000 0K) have yet to be validated in simulated environments but modeling and
sizing studies do attest to the feasibility of the ablative material to
survive if the design entry envelope is met. The steepest angles are selected
to limit maximum deceleration in the worst atmosphere model to 800 gE (limit
load) which yields a 1000 gE ultimate load capability (factor of safety = 1.25).
The entry corridors for Jupiter, Saturn and Uranus are defined in Figure 15.
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Multilayer Insulation Contamination
The materials most apt to proliferate debris in a planet's atmosphere are
the multiple layers of mylar and nylon net used to inhibit radiant heat loss
during transit and descent to atmosphere encounter. A failure mechanism of
peeling and tearing is postulated. The precise nature of these flakes is
difficult to predict. A worst-case analysis is shown in Figure 18. The
maximum heat flux due to convection is for single sheets of mylar falling through
Saturn's atmosphere. Being very thin (%.004 in.) the torn sheets of plastic
have very small heat capacity so they will self-sterilize.
MYLAR MLI HEAT ANALYSIS
WORST CASE:
VELOCITY PERPENDICULAR
J/
.5'53_-
A) FLAT PLATE B) TEAR DROP C) EDGEWISE
Figure 18
Mylar density is high compared to that of an integral probe. The result
is that a piece of mylar would be subjected to similar heat fluxes during high
altitude descent. Since mylar melts at temperatures below 600'F (See Figure 19)
its penetration to the life zone is unlikely. If it does not melt the surfaces
will have been heated to temperatures that sterilize in seconds. Thus, even
though destruction is not readily provable except by extensive tunnel
and free-fall tests, survival of the material is considered to be a low
probability.
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SURVIVAL OF MLI LAYERS DURING ENTRY
SATURN ENTRIES
4000 -,
COOL ATMOSPHERE
MLI LAYER
6" X 6" x .00025"
0 3000 / 21 3000 M/C A = .006 gm/cm
LU V
2000 -
LJ
WARM ATMOSPHERE
1000-
MYLAR MELT TEMPERATURE
0 ,
0 20 40 60 80
ENTRY ANGLE - DEGREES
Figure 19
Falling in other than a flat plate shape such as on edge or in a folded
or teardrop configuration increase M/CDA further which cause peak heat flux,
, to be encountered at a lower altitude where p atm is higher. The result is
that a flat plate assumption yields the best potential for survival to the
life zone.
Chunking or particle release down to the particle dimensions defined by
Gonzalez, et. al. in Reference 13 indicate that minute particles of the order
of 1 to 30 p can survive Jovian entry for low angle, low peak heat flux
conditions. The possibility that these particles will retain viable organisms
has not been proven. With Taylor's work the probability of growth requires
survival to the life zone, freedom from high altitude ultraviolet irradiation,
and a source of moisture and other nutritional compounds.
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Ablative Material
The sterility of the ablative material is discussed under Minimization
of Microbial Load. Break-off or spallation of carbon phenolic or silicone
materials may occur after peak deceleration as a result of rapid cooling in
cool, hydrogen rich atmospheres. The severity of such break-up is unknown but
design analysis and testing under simulated entry conditions is imperative
to prevent excessive spallation. Descent stability is adversely affected by
holes, especially holes that penetrate the inner surface. The chunks and particles,
however, can be made free from biology by prelaunch heating and bagging.
Internal Microbe Loads
This analysis has determined that probe internal microbial loads are a non-
contaminator if structural integrity is retained down to temperature levels
where melting of the aluminum structure occurs. In satellite descents,
on the other hand, impact with a liquid or solid surface may precipitate
break up. Analysis of this release mechanism is beyond the scope of this study.
Probe Sensor Ports
The probe structure is a vented structure to permit continuous pressure
equalization during ascent form Earth and descent into the target planet. The
mating surfaces approximate a semi-sealed condition to inhibit massive entry
of gases which would create a destabilizing force, increase convective heat
transfer, and permit scouring action by the gases of internal surfaces. The
latter process is biologically contaminating owing to escaping and mixing
during the spinning descent. Because of this the sensor ports must be treated
prior to launch to absolutely minimize terrestrial contaminants.
There are 6 openings to be treated as seen in Figure 20. The neutral
mass spectrometer sampling tube and exhaust port are considered to be non-
contaminating because it is a sealed, evacuated instrument at launch and
remains so throughout t ransit. When the instrument is deployed (and uncapped)
the probe is in a subsonic descent mode. Also, the probe is still revolving
around its axis of symmetry with a predicted oscillation of 100 or less.
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PROBE SENSOR PORT LOCATIONS
NEPHELOMETER
WINDOW
MASS SPECTROMETER M.S. EXHAUST TOTAL PRESSURE SENSOR
SAMPLING TUBE (CLOSED CAVITIES)
- SEVERED UMBILICAL
FORE AND AFT HEATSHIELD MATING SURFACE
TOTAL TEMPERATURE SENSOR Figure 20
Thus, the tube tracks the stagnation point and the exit is diametrically opposed.
Both conditions tend to minimize particulate contamination upon which
biology is dependent. The tube is sealed to preclude flow into the equipment
compartment and the pressure sensor consists of four closed cavities which
improve accuracy in a variable pressure environment (- four orders of
magnitude change). The combined tubing network is carefully sealed to assure
accuracy of measurement. This prevents intermingling of gases between the
innards of the instruments and the cavity inside the forward heat shield.
Similarly, the temperature probe, nephelometer, and radiometer/photometer
instrument either deploy through self-sealing openings or have closed openings
even when the ablative cover port is ejected. The severed umbilical cable re-
mains as a stub. A suitable ablative, wire insulation specified
guarantee that it will not melt away to a level below the inner surface.
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It too is sealed round about its opening with a grommet. There are three
other depressions in the back cover for probe/spacecraft mounting. All
attachments can be into blind holes to assure that no passage exists.
The principal macroscopic opening is the parting line between heat shields.
This opening will be carefully engineered but without a sealing ring. The
primary criterion is prevention of cracking of either ablator or supporting
honeycomb structure caused by differing expansion characteristics.
The treatment of the closing ports and emplaced seals requires cleanliness
and extinction of spores and vegetatives prior to final insertion. If a
contaminating condition at any port is experienced, corrective action of a
local nature is to be carried out. The form probably will be subject to man-
ufacturing-engineering-quality control-planetary quarantine control action
similar to that involved in all Material Review Board actions. The specific
action taken will have to be a previously approved technique, but implementation
has to be evaluated contemporarily.
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COST SAVINGS
Schedule Effects - The cost estimates of Reference 1 were based on the
imposition of heat sterilization techniques for controlling microbe counts to
launch. Some reduction in development costs were estimated because of inherit-
ance from Viking, specifically, in use of NASA Approved Parts Lists for electron-
ics and instruments. In general, some level-of-effort staffing increase to
sustaining personnel in the microbi6logical assay and monitor functions along
with some particular additions and changes in components. The impact on sched-
ule was considered to be zero to slight.
All aspects of engineering, procurement, manufacturing, and operations were
reviewed to determine total impact. Figure 21 shows some of the key effects that
can be anticipated if heat sterilization is specified, especially if multiple
sterilization cycles are adopted to insure low counts. The effects are an aver-
age increase in any one activity of 1.5 months to a base estimate of 8.2 months.
This represents an 18% increase in direct manhours in probe assembly and delivery.
The remainder of increased cost is accountable to all components. Another effect
of the increase in time is a need for moving the authority to proceed (ATP) for-
ward one month (results from 1.1 month general shift).
The schedule impact of increased dependence on cleanliness alone will mater-
ially shorten the development time. Study of Alternative I indicates that the
average increase can be held to about one month. Study of Alternative II
indicates no stretchout in program time. The reduction in costs with these two
levels of cleanliness are discussed below in the treatment of costs.
Cost Impacts
The estimate of 21% in Reference 1 ($8.3 million compared to $39.6
million) precipitated a strong interest in the study of alternative techniques
that could fulfill the planetary quarantine objectives with distinct cost
advantages. The first alternative consists of implementation of a Class 100
room (no more than 100 particles 5 microns or larger per cubic foot) combined
with an antibioload (antiseptic) treatment to remove residual or accidentally
large counts (see Figure 22, Alternate I).
(PAGE 44 BLANK)
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COMPARISON OF COSTS - ALTERNATIVES I & II
(103 1973 Dollars)
Alternate I Class 100 Room + Final (1) Heat Cycle
Subsystem Design & Dev Test Flight () Mission Total
Analysis Program Hardware Support Program
Structure $ 89 $.480 $ 155 -- $ 725
Heat Shield -- 38 -- -- 38
Power & Distribution 124 139 169 -- 431
Telecommunications 
-- 382 377 -- 759
Mission/Aero Analysis -- 5 4 -- 9
Thermal Control 
-- 18 15 -- 34
Pyrotechnics 149 22 15 -- 187
Inst-Engineering 
-- 9 8 -- 17
Inst-Scientific(2) -- 13 8 -- 21
System Integration 139 400 605 $553 1697
Reliability 13 -- -- -- 13
Tooling 78 4 188 -- 269
GSE 250 18 8 -- 276
Program Management 38 21 12 33 103
Operations & Control 14 34 26 -- 73
Totals $893 $1582 $1592 $585 $4652
Alternate II Class 100,000 Room + UV Irradiation
Structure 
-- $ 321 $ 86 $ -- $407
Heat Shield -- 25 -- -- 25
Power & Distribution -- 109 120 -- 229
Tlecommunications -- 194 189 -- 383
Mission/Aero Analysis -- 2 2 -- 5
Thermal Control -- 10 8 -- 17
Pyrotechnics 
-- 12 8 -- 20
Inst-Engineering -- 5 4 -- 10
Inst-Scientific(2 ) -- 9 4 -- 13
System Integration $130 203 400 553 1285
Reliability 17 -- -- -- 17
Tooling -- -- -- -- --
GSE 179 -- 7 -- 185
Program Management 12 14 12 32 70
Operations & Control 11 37 13 -- 60
Totals $348 $942 $852 $585 $2727
(1) 4 Flight Units, 3 flights
(2) CFE Science Instruments
Figure 22
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A pilot operation of a Class 100 room in which personal hygeine, repre-
sentative fabrication and troubleshooting work, and careful accounting of
expended time and dollars has shown feasibility. The work was carried out to
compare cleanliness with documented heat sterilization procedures; it is
described in Reference 14.
In the second alternative Class 100,000 rooms (the same standard per
Reference 15 but 100,000 particles rather than 100) would be the site for
virtually all operations. When manufacturing operations dictate departure
from the confines of a Class 100,000 room some antibioload procedure is
imposed to transfer it back. A careful selection of techniques is to be made
prior to Phase C/D to choose among the various features:
Installation Cost (nonrecurring)
Deactivation Effectiveness (kill capability)
Performance Reductions
Schedule - Operations Impacts (recurring costs)
Life Shortening Effects
In all three cases a principal cost impact is that associated with
additional handling and record keeping to assure accountability and trace-
ability of parts, components and the assembly. This type of expense can be
minimized by combining the data to be gathered with traditional quality
assurance, reliability and maintainability records. All have a bearing on
mission accomplishment.
The results of the two alternative cost analyses are displayed in
Figure 22 with the significant features of each summarized in Figure 23. The
successive cost reductions from $8.3 million to $4.6 to $2.9 million, though
preliminary in nature, represent realistic magnitudes and ratios. The latter
cost increments amount to 12% and 7%, respectively, of direct probe costs.
The original $8.3 million increment has been estimated to represent about a 6%
addition to overall costs. The ratio of planetary quarantine to overall cost
would obtain in all three cases.
The cost data breakdowns are similar to previously submitted data,
however, some regrouping has been effected to simplify the matrix. Thus, all
Mission Support, which is basically time and material to support launch and
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FEATURES OF PLANETARY QUARANTINE CONCEPTS
HEAT STERILIZATION ALTERNATE I ALTERNATE II
(1130 FOR TBD HOURS) (CLASS 100 ROOM) (CLASS 100,000 ROOM)
o TERMINAL STERILIZATION CYCLE o CONTROLLED CLEANLINESS IN ALL o CLEANLINESS EXERCISED IN
(113 0C FOR UP TO 54 (HRS) ASSEMBLY STEPS (CLASS 100 STANDARD COMPONENT AND
ROOM/LAMINAR FLOW) ASSEMBLY AREAS (CLASS
o MULTIPLE BIOLOAD REDUCTIONS 100,000 ROOM; RESTRICTED
(1 TO 8 POSSIBLE) o CORRECTIVE STERILIZATION ZONES)
(WHEN NEEDED) (3) o NIGHT TIME UV IRRADIATION
o SPORE ASSAYING AND o LAMINAR FLOW BENCH UTILIZATION
ESTIMATING o FREQUENT ROOM AND PART ASSAYS
FOR BIOLOAD o ROUTINE ROOM AND PART ASSAYS;
o NASA APPROVED PARTS LIST CORRECTIVE ACTIONS, AS
COMPONENTS-OR-QUALIFY TO o PROTECTIVE COVER REQUIRED (4) NEEDED (3)
MEET TEMPERATURES
SBIOSHIELD REQUIRED (1) o BATTERY SPECIALLY DESIGNED (5) o PROTECTIVE COVER REQUIRED (4)o BIOSHIELD 1)
o NIGHTTIME ULTRAVIOLET .o BATTERY SPECIALLY DESIGNED (5)
o BATTERY AND WIRING SPECIALLY IRRADIATION
DESIGNED (2) o FULL PARTS CONTROL AND
o FULL PARTS CONTROL AND TRACEABILITY (6)
o FULL PARTS CONTROL AND TRACEABILITY (6)
TRACEABILITY (6)
(1) BIOSHIELD LAUNCHED; COVER JETTISONED (4) COVER FOR GROUND OPERATIONS; COVER
AT INSERTION OMITTED AT S/C-PROBE STACKING(2) STERILIZABLE BATTERY; HIGH (5) STERILIZABLE BATTERY ADVISABLE TO REDUCE
TEMPERATURE WIRING PROGRAM RISK ESPECIALLY FOR SATURN & TITAN(3) PHENOL WIPING; ETHYLENE OXIDE IN (6) STANDARD PRACTICE AUGMENTED WITH
DIMETHYL SULFOXIDE; OR UV CLEANLINESS (AND STERILIZATION CYCLING)
IRRADIATION OF PARTS BEFORE ASSEMBLY
Figure 23
mission operations, has been grouped as integration or management functions.
It has apparently increased because some flight hardware costs were moved in
the cost estimating relationships. Other minor internal costing changes have
resulted from other changes in internal accountability.
The Design and Analysis functions are the most significantly affected in
both alternatives. Development Testing and Flight Hardware costs decrease
because there is no hard and fast requirement for a bioshield or extensive
improvements in the power supply. As in previous costing exercises four
flight units were assumed, the fourth of which is an upgraded Proof Test Unit,
and all instruments are engineered and procured directly by the Contractor.
If either assumption is changed, the overall numbers could decrease.
It is concluded that lower cost alternatives are available, but a
cautionary note is required that some validation testing of the effectiveness
of cleanliness, assaying, and correctional sterilizing is needed prior to
determination of final drawing releases and firm cost estimations (Phase C/D,
Development and Operations).
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DEFINITIONS
Terms
Ablative A material that absorbs heat by decomposition to gases.
Allocation An allowable probability of contamination, established
by NASA (see Reference 3)
Autosterilization An integrated (temperature-time) relationship that
assure kill.
Bioload, The microbial burden estimated to be on a spacecraft
bioburden or component
Class XXX Cleanliness criteria (see Reference 15)
Cure A fabrication procedure for completing phenolic linkages
in ablative materials
Epoxy A strong plastic resin
Freon A trade name for flurocarbons
Heat-irradiation Combined dry heat and y-ray exposure
Life Zone A temperature-altitude region of the planetary
atmosphere that can support vegetatives
Midcourse Maneuver A spacecraft control action to improve targeting
Penetrant A liquid that promotes penetration into cracks and
crevices.
Spalling A mechanism of erosion (beyond ablation)
Spore A dormant form of a bacterial (vegetative) cell
Survival-Microbe Ability of terrestrial biology to enter outer planet
alive and able to proliferate
-Probe Ability of probe to enter without catastrophic failure
Vegetatives The evolved cell which proliferates
C GpAG BLA NOT FIMED
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Notation
A Angstrom unit (10 nanometers)
C/D Phase designation - Execution
CFE Contractor Furnished Equipment
COSPAR Committee of Space Research
F Centerline
D Decade reduction time (logarithmic kill rate)
gE Earth gravity (980 cm/sec
2
GSE Ground Support Equipment
H/C Honeycomb (herein: phenolic filled fiber glass)
HT-424 A trade name designation of an adhesive
kg Kilogram
KSC Kennedy Space Center
krad Kilorad of radiant energy
M/CDA Ballistic coefficient (gm/cm2)
MLI Multi-layer insulation (mylar and nets)
M.S. Mass spectrometer
n Number
P Probability value (subscripts defined where introduced)
Pressure (atm)
q Heat flux (Btu/ft2-sec)
Q Total heat input (Btu/ft2)
S/C Spacecraft
SUAEP Saturn/Uranus Atmospheric Entry Probe
T Temperature (deg C, F and K)
TBD To be determined
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Notation
(cont.)
TSC Terminal Sterilization Cycle
ULD A trade name designation for a silicone material
UV Ultraviolet
y Magetism (10-5 gaus1
High frequency ( 10 Hz) electromagnetic wave (10- to
10-2 MeV)
Entry angle at a selected altitude (usually 450 Km)
p Density (gm/cm3 )
a A measure of standard deviation
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APPENDIX A
COMPARABLE SPACECRAFT CONTAMINATION LEVELS
Several other spacecraft have been checked for microbial load as part of
the development of quarantine procedures. Up until the Viking program all forms
of microbes were monitored to acquire adequate statistics on the form and counts
extant. The relative amounts are illustrated in the table for the Pioneer F
and G (10 and 11) Jupiter-bound spacecraft.
TABLE A-l
Pioneer F and G Microbial Estimates (Atotal = 63 m2
Spacecraft Species Type Count (n/m2)
F Vegetative Aerobes 226.0
Anaerobes 74.3
Subtotal 300.3 x 63 = 1.9 x 104
Spores Aerobic 301.4
Anaerobic 0
Subtotal 301.4 x 63 - 1.9 x 10
4
3.8 x 104 total
G Vegetative Aerobic 231.4
Anaerobic 104.4
Subtotal 335.8 x 63 = 21.2 x 104
Spores Aerobic 452.0
Anaerobic 0
Subtotal 452. x 63 = 2.9 x 104
24.1 x 10 total
The data of Table A-2 reflect a nearly 10:1 ratio in bioload on spacecraft
tested under similar conditions and consecutively with the same crew. The
actual samples were made at Kennedy Space Center on 26 selected locations
all of which were located under the inverted umbrella of the antenna dish.
As stated in the reports from John R. Puleo to Dr. Lawrence B. Hall
(References 16 and 17), the sampling consisted of cleaning the 2 x 2 inch square
areas and testing using NASA Standard Methods. Mr. Puleo, Chief of the HEW
Spacecraft Bioassy Unit has cautioned that the two factors, protected sites and
cleaned surfaces, must be considered in evaluating these results for future
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prognostications of bioload. One further note indicated doubt about the
magnitude of the spacecraft surface area.
Other checks have been made by NASA, in particular the data tabulated in
the following table, shows a slightly lower level of assayed spore bioload (see
Reference 6).
TABLE A-2
Mariner Microbial Load
Exposed Surface
Spacecraft (Vegetatives + Spores) Total Spore Count
#8 13 x 104  3 x 104
#9 (MM '71) 3.1 x 104  3 x lO4
The data obtained do indicate that spacecraft can be built without decon-
tamination (Pioneer) and have spore counts ranging from 104 to just over lO5
microbes, and with decontamination procedures (Mariner) the count can be held
to about 104 spores. Interest is increasingly directed at spore counts only
because of the difficulty in eliminating them by cleaning or wiping procedures.
Some spores in fact have D-values running to 20 or more hours at 125C
temperatures.
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APPENDIX B
TECHNIOUE FOR SWAB SAMPLING
a. Areas to be swabbed are outlined using sterile cardboard templates
sterilized in an autoclave at 121 0 C for 30 minutes. Their sterility is
ascertained by periodic swabbing of randomly selected templates from their
sterile container. Each template will delineate a 4 in2 area.
b. Swabs used for these samplings are made of absorbent cotton on wooden sticks
which can be readily broken off into sterile diluent with asepsis. Their
sterility is ascertained by periodically placing randomly selected swabs
from their sterile container into Brain Heart Infusion (BHI) broth and
then incubating at 300C for 72 hours.
c. Diluent for the swab sampling is 0.85% NaCl, sterilized in an autoclave
while encased in glass in screwcap tubes at 121 0C for 30 minutes. Their
sterility will be ascertained by pour plate as described in f., and g.,
below.
d. The area delineated by the sterile template is swabbed thoroughly with a
sterile swab taking care to revolve the swab slowly to prevent dislodging
already collected microorganisms. When the area is completely swabbed,
the spent cotton tip is broken off into a sterile glass tube of diluent in
such manner that the portion of the wooden stick touched by the hand does
not contact the tube or diluent.
e. The cap is replaced on the diluent tube and the cotton swab material dis-
persed evenly in the diluent by vortexing for 60 seconds.
f. Serial 10-fold dilutions are prepared from each dispersed swab by removing
1.0 ml to 9.0 ml portions of sterile diluent in separate tubes. Four such
dilutions should be made of each swab suspension. These tubes now repre-
sent 100, 10-l, 10-2, 10-3 , and 10-4 dilutions of the original suspensions.
The remaining wooden stick is aseptically removed from the 100 suspension
using flame sterilized forceps, and then each dilution is poured into
respective petri plates marked 100, 10 -l , 10-2 , 10-3 , and 10-4 . Ninety ml
of BHI broth containing 1.5% melted agar cooled to 450C is then added to
each plate. A blank plate containing no added diluent suspension also
receives 90 ml of melted BHI agar to ascertain its sterility.
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g. All plates are incubated at 300C for 72 hours, the colonies counted, and
reported as 72 hour results.
h. Spore counts are determined by the same procedure except that prior to
Step f., the 100 suspension is heated to 700C for 15 minutes to kill the
vegetative cells in the sample.
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APPENDIX C
A PROCEDURE FOR COMPONENT HANDLING
a. Brown paper bags large enough for components to readily contain the
components. They are sterilized in an autoclave at 121 0C for 30 minutes.
This is done in the container in which the bags are to be stored until used.
b. The container has a readily accessible opening to allow removal of the bags
when desired for component storage. Sterility is not mandatory since only
maintenance of cleanliness of the probe components is of concern. Thus,
no handling procedures beyond those normally practiced in microbiological
laminar flow hood are imposed.
c. Each paper bag contains a designated area for clearly marking the name of
the component and the date in which it was placed into the paper bag.
d. The component and paper bag are then placed in a plastic bag to prevent
dust contamination and placed in storage until it is to be assembled.
The plastic bags are a standard clean room type which is never reused
once opened.
(PAGE C-2 BLANK)
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APPENDIX D
JOVIAN RADIATION INACTIVATION CAPABILITY
The study of Jovian trapped radiation is included because it significantly
reduces externally located microbes. The magnetospheres of Saturn and Uranus
are not well defined as yet but it is presumed that they possess one because
some decimetric radiation has been detected. Because of its weakness, only
occasional bursts of decametric emission have been observed on Earth. Never-
theless, it is prudent to assume that some radiation will be encountered and
some effect on external biology anticipated.
The effect of radiation of microbes on probes is categorized as somatic
rather than chronic or genetic. Somatic effects produce direct manifestations
in the microbes which lead to early inactivation; genetic and chronic effects
are associated with animals, such as mice, monkeys, or men, and are long term
effects. Data gathered to date indicate that increasing radiation doses pro-
duce increasing manifestations. Dose rates and energy levels have variations
that prevent simple generalization. High energy protons are not as deadly
as low energy protons presumably because they pass through the spore too
rapidly. On the other hand electrons at high energies are more effective
killers than those at low energies. More dose rate data is required to
clarify trends. The analysis of rates can be limited to spores because
vegetative microbes are more susceptible to prelaunch removal and will die off
more rapidly in the planets.
RADIATION ENVIRONMENT
The Jovian trapped radiation is of a nature and strength that some
sterilization of an entry probe will occur. Although the probe mission under
study here is primarily targeted to Saturn or Uranus, the goal is a probe
that inherently is adaptable to Jupiter or to the satellites of one of the outer
planets. Study of the Jovian radiation effects serves as a base for the
analysis of the other planets and as an upper bound on all planetary entry
probes. The approach consists of defining a model, establishing a baseline
entry trajectory (ultimately an optimal corridor), determining the radiant
dosages, computing survival fractions of bioloads, and finally establishing
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the credit to be taken for maintaining planetary quarantine. The carry over
to Saturn and Uranus is purely inferential since the defined models for these
planets are still speculative. The model of proton and electron fluxes used
in this study is based on the preliminary reduction of Pioneer 10 data returns.
These are subject to revision but are representative of probable steriliza-
tion potential. As seen in Figure D-l, the proton data is scattered and
still somewhat indefinite in the final portions of a descent to the atmosphere.
The dip in the proton curve from 3.4 to 3 R is assigned to a sweeping action
of Amalthea (V), which is at a radius of 2.53 R , but may be very effective in
removing protons. Verification of this effectiveness awaits additional flybys
such as Pioneer 11. Similarly, the slopes and intercepts at 1 RJ also
require further data before precision in defining the local environment can
be accomplished. This study is therefore qualitative in nature for two
reasons:
o Definition of the environment is arbitrarily defined from 3 R to 1 R .
o Low energy protons are segregated inadequately from background noise.
The latter problem is particularly troublesome because, as is shown later, the
low energy protons are the more efficient microbe killers.
JOVIAN RADIATION ENVIRONMENT
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The descent history of a probe to atmospheric entry used in this analysis
is shown in Figure D-2. It is targeted at a low Jovian entry from the
northern hemisphere with an, as yet, minimal attention to wobble of the
magnetodisc. An optimal trajectory will be synchronized to penetrate a
minimal amount of dense layers of trapped radiation. At least four radiation
characteristics need to be considered before final timing of entry is
decided:
o Shape of the contours of constant flux (lines of isoflux) to avoid
established local concentrations.
o Definition of the dipole location to take advantage of any "South
Atlantic" anomaly conditions.
o Sweeping effect of all satellites to minimize encounter with trapped
radiation.
o Targeting preferences of terminator proximity (longitude), latitude
(zone or band), and relative velocity.
In general, radiant energy encounter is treated as a minus because of damage
to electronic equipment directly by electron displacement, etc. and indirectly
by macroscopic heating from the energy transferred to all molecules in the
probe. The sterilization of bioburden though beneficial to planetary
quarantine is heavily counter-balanced by the damage factors. Thus, optimiza-
tion of early missions is strongly outweighed by the desire to minimize the
dose and specific energy levels and rates of exposure. The purpose of this
study was to determine whether an appropriate order of magnitude could be
established for use in the probability analysis. Actually, no credit was
taken for Saturn or Uranus entries even though there remains a possibility of
several decades reduction of externally located bioburden on an entry probe.
The procedure followed consisted of numerically integrating the dose
using Figures D-2 and D-l. An examination of relative biological effectiveness
led to the conclusion that little or no multiplying effect on kill rate can be
presumed at this analysis stage; the linear energy transfer (let) function
obtained from x-ray and x-ray doses fails to show a strong effect so the con-
servative approach consisted of assigning a value of one. These data were
drawn from Reference 18.
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The radiant energy transmissibility of materials indicates that low
energy particles, at least, are only efficient biocidal agents in the multi-
layer insulation and on the outer layers of the ablator. Curves for trans-
missibility in aluminum (a high nuclear cross-section (Z) metal), carbon and
water are illustrated in Figure D-3. Both plastic materials and microbes lie
along the water curve so penetration was computed for 5 MeV electrons and
protons. Protons at this energy level do not completely penetrate the 30
layers of mylar. The interspersed layers of dacron net were ignored because
they have large openings which do not inhibit transmission universally.
Electrons at 5 MeV pass through the multiple layers of insulation and the
carbon phenolic so they are very effective as a biocidal agent.
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To convert exposure from fluences to dose (in kilorads), Figure D-4 is
employed. The fluences of Figure D-5 at known energy levels are multiplied by
the dose factor to obtain dose in kilorads. Multiple curves of exposure and
survival are eventually needed to get a complete picture of interrelationships.
DOSE FACTOR AND ENERGIES
DOSE FACTORS DOSE
10-4- 
108
5-10 10
LLJ S.-
-- PROTON DOSE FACTOR
1 PROTONS
~40 6
m 1~
9 ELECTRONSv 0
0 102
10
10 -ELECTRON DOSE FACTOR 1
i10-  101 2 1 --- -
10- 1 1 1  102 0 10 20 30
ENERGY LEVEL (MeV) ENERGY LEVEL (MeV)
FIGURE D-4
D-6
JOVIAN FLUENCE LEVELS
JUPITER - 1979 LAUNCH
1015 1015
1014  1014
PRE.IMINAR PIONEER DATA
(MAY 74)
1013 1013
RC INTERATED 10I
FPROBE FLUENCES
_E E>eMeV (J JL 74) E> 16.2 MeV
EL 1 0V
E > __._ V o12 0 12
3 10 10
1 W 31511
>21 14eV'- _ 10 10AR
INTEGRA
FLUENCES10 10 E > 3 MeV
PRE IMINARY T (JUL 74)
PIONEER DAT C
([AY 74)
10 .10
108  10
8
1 2 3 4 5 6 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
MAGNETIC SHELL PARAMETER, L (Rj) MAGNETIC SHELL PARAMETER, L (Rj)
FIGURE D-5
Figure D-6 shows the effects of protons at 2 MeV on microbes. The survival
fraction of spores is relatively constant over 4 decade variations in dose
rate. The survival fraction decreases steadily (-0.5 x 101) for a single
decade in total dose. From these data it is concluded that kill efficiency
increases with total exposure but only one or two decades in the range of 10
to 104 Krad. The effect on nonspore-formers (vegetatives) is shown for
comparison. It can be seen that they are considerably more susceptible when
they are present. As stated in the body of report, vegetative microbes are
also more susceptible to sterilization techniques prior to launch.
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Electron inactivations are more varied in their effects because data which
list dose rates seem to change with energy level but not in a consistent way,
as seen in Figure D-7. The kill characteristic is reversed from protons, viz.,
increasing energy results in decreasing effectiveness. Because of the
variability, a conservative value is used in this report. The effects and the
nominal value are summarized in Figure D-8. The extrapolations of the data
seem to be valid based on the normal behavior of spores in an inactivation
environment.
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One question in particular is not answered: Are the lethal
characteristics of trapped protons and electrons additive? No convenient
means is available for simultaneous exposure to charged electrons and protons.
The combined heat and y-irradiation at Sandia Laboratories (References 9 and
10) indicate that combined stresses may produce a synergistic response in
lethality. A simple addition produces upwards of nine decades of microbial
reduction. If synergistic inactivation does occur, this could increase to
10 or 12 decades. In either case an entry in Jupiter's atmosphere is virtually
certain to sterilize the exterior layers of a probe.
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EXTRAPOLATED SPORE SURVIVAL FRACTIONS
o DOSE RATE EFFECTS ARE ASSUMED NEGLIGIBLE
o ADDITIVE OR SYNERGISTIC EFFECTS OF SIMULTANEOUS EXPOSURE TO MULTIPLE
ENERGY LEVELS AND MULTIPLE KINDS OF IRRADIATION REQUIRES CONSIDERABLE
TEST VALIDATION
o EFFECT OF LINEAR ENERGY TRANSFER (LET) CONSIDERED TO BE NEGLIGIBLE
o SPORES CONSIDERED TO BE KILLED IF IRRADIATED; THUS, TRANSMISSION DEPTH
IN MULTI-LAYER INSULATION, ETC. MUST BE DETERMINED
o NON-SPORE-FORMERS SEEM TO BE 101 TO 103 MORE SUSCEPTIBLE THAN SPORES
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